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Abstract
Discrimination based on age can affect same-aged and intergenerational interactions, presenting
socially and economically undesirable phenomena. To investigate the effects of age stereotypes
on cooperation, we presented older adults (over age 50) and younger adults (under age 25) with
belief elicitation tasks (about anticipated interactions) and then a series of same, different, and
unknown-aged group interactions in a Sender-Receiver game. Compared to the in-group (the age
group they belong to) both younger and older participants stereotyped the out-group (the age
group they did not belong to) as relatively different and more uncooperative than observed to be.
We have only partial support for the notion that stereotypers behaved strategically: while
younger stereotypers acted relatively uncooperatively and earned more, older stereotypers acted
relatively cooperatively (despite out-group beliefs) and earned less. We discuss the implications
of these findings for social identity theory, stereotype theory, and intergenerational interactions
in an aging society.
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Introduction
Age, like gender, is a natural category used for social recognition and classification (Brewer,
Dull, & Lui, 1981) and likely universal to all peoples. Infants as young as 5 months old have
been shown to recognize people based on age (Fagot & Singer, 1979; Fagot & Leinbach, 1993),
young adults have demonstrated the ability to extract and process age-dependent signals in
sampled body odors so as to correctly identify older adults from younger adults (Mitro et al.,
2012), and various studies with adults of varied ages using implicit age-association primes show
stereotyping and behavioral effects based on age (e.g., see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998; Gross & Hardin, 2007; Hess et al., 2004; Levy 1996; Levy et al., 2000; Perdue and
Gurtman,1990).
Beliefs attributed to age-group membership have been shown to negatively affect interactions
between adults (Bargh et al., 1996; McConnell & Leibold, 2001), interfering with the individual
and mutual benefits possible and providing emotional (Levy, Ashman, & Dror, 1999-2000) or
even physiological distress (Levy et al., 2000). In this study we investigate whether distinct
beliefs about age groups cause an economic impact (either positive or negative) – an area of
concern that has not yet been addressed experimentally.
We brought younger and older adults to the laboratory to participate in an incentivized
experiment exploring the economic effects of age-based stereotypes1 and strategies. While some
individuals may derive economic gains from accurate age-based stereotypes, we focus our
inquiry on ageism: behavior based on (young or old) age attributes that negatively impacts one’s
self, others, or cooperation2.
This study has been designed to investigate a few main questions: “do people stereotype and
discriminate based on age, and if so how?”, and “who is economically harmed by ageist beliefs
and strategies?” To address these questions, we used a set of incentive compatible belief
elicitation tasks3 that we refer to as the “guess game” (details of the guess game and its
accompanying scoring rule are found in the methods section). Our guess game asked participants
to make guesses (that would later be scored for accuracy) about the frequency of anticipated
behaviors of senders and receivers in their same age group (the “in-group”), different age group
(the “out-group”), and unknown-aged group (2x3) interactions in a Sender-Receiver game. Next
the participants engaged in all these interactions. Guesses made in the guess game and their
subsequent effects on behavior inform us of the economic consequences of revealed age-based
stereotypes and discrimination4 based on age.
To our knowledge, the particular “Bluff-Challenge” Sender-Receiver game which we used in
this study has not been used before in laboratory experiments. The “Bluff-Challenge” game is a
1

We define the term “stereotype” as an “exaggerated belief associate with a category” (Allport, 1935, p.287)
This definition of ageism is broader than the more commonly used one (e.g. see Nelson, 2002): “stereotyping and
prejudice against older persons”.
3
Incentive compatible belief elicitation tasks allow researchers to examine if people reveal accurate beliefs, if their
beliefs deviate from equilibrium behavior, and if affected behaviors are consistent with beliefs (Rey-Biel 2009).
4
We use the term “discrimination” in the sense of Cuddy & Fiske (2002) and Kite & Wagner (2002) who consider
the phenomenon of ageism to involve three components: stereotypes (cognitive aspect), prejudice (affective
aspect/feelings) and discrimination (behavioral aspect).
2
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zero-sum sender-receiver game with asymmetric information that allows an informed sender to
send a true message about the size of a resource state available for equal sharing, or (when a
larger resource is available) to “bluff”, by sending a false message that a smaller resource is
available for equal sharing. Receivers, uninformed of the true size of resource in this game, can
accept the sender’s message at face value or else challenge message veracity. A receiver cannot
audit message veracity without challenging, and only by challenging can a sender be prevented
from cryptically embezzling the difference between the smaller and larger resource. A receiver
who challenges a false message gains the entire resource that was available, which the sender
misrepresented, while the sender forfeits it entirely. A receiver who challenges a true message
forfeits the share of the resource that the sender offered for equal sharing, while the sender gains
the resource entirely. Due to the nature of the game, the sender has economic incentives to
deceive, and the receiver has economic incentives to avoid deception. Specific details about this
game are described in the methods section below.
We chose the Bluff-Challenge game because it models the resource division opportunities found
in unsupervised and working relationships that are subject to the uncertainty of nature, require
voluntary and honest contributions to partnership, but allow risky and potentially lucrative
opportunities to embezzle resources and challenge message veracity. We assume that the
cooperation dilemma modeled by this game presented a recurrent selection pressure among
ancestral humans and continues to be relevant today5. Outside of the laboratory, analogues to the
game interactions are often encountered between younger and older coworkers or family
members and invoke trust, suspicion, trustworthiness, and opportunism. Opportunities for
bluffing modeled in the game arise by chance, are not affected by age-dependent performance,
and are equally available in same, different, or unknown-aged group interactions – providing
conditions for identifying when and how ageist beliefs and discrimination occur.
Background
Humans construct social stereotypes and engage in social categorization to cope with social
challenges, such as identifying, encoding, and recalling members of other groups, making sense
of what qualifies a social group, and informing decisions of how to deal with them (e.g., Darley
& Fazio, 1980; Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). One of these social challenges, relative to our study, is
managing cooperation with unknown others and with others of different social groups in dyadic
social dilemmas that provide incentive for non-cooperation. Perceivers recognize stereotypes of
loosely structured constellations of traits to be variably true of individual members of a social
category (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981) like age. Stereotypes about other groups tend towards
5

Cooperative (distributed) foraging with sharing is a hallmark of our species (Gurven, 2000). With this type of
foraging and sharing, individuals run the risk of being exploited by “free-riding” partners who cheat by either not
acquiring resources at the agreed rate (slacking, shirking), or else not pooling their acquired resources (as expected)
by under-representing what they acquired (and embezzling the difference). Another important problem to contend
with in these interactions is the risk involved with accusing a partner of cheating – if and when they are suspected.
Cheater accusations and challenges directed at partners in a trust contract, when unfounded, could damage
established trust and ruin the possibility of successful future dyadic interactions, thereby imposing high risks to the
challenger. In modern society, cooperative labor and redistribution arrangements often present similar challenges.
For example consider restaurant workers who agree to pool their tips: individual waiters earn their tips from
restaurant patrons and contribute all their earnings to a central place (e.g. a tip jar) to be divided equally with coworkers at the end of a shift.
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polar extremes of a characteristic, such that opposites often emerge among the common
stereotypes (Palmore, 1999). As such, stereotypes of others are salient social identifiers (useful
for informing strategy selection) while also being time- and energy-savers (McGarty et al.,
2002): they are simple and easier to understand than more detailed information (Tajfel, 1981),
facilitate better recall (Macrae, Milne, Bodenhausen, 1994), and are thrifty in terms of cognitive
demands (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1994).
Social identity theories (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986; Hog & Abrams 1993) suggest that
people make a fundamental division of social groups into “us” (in-groups) and “them” (outgroups) so as to reduce uncertainty about expected behaviors and build concepts of themselves
and others vis-à-vis group membership. A natural consequence of these social divisions is
creation of belief in an inter-group contrast (Brewer & Brown, 1998) where stereotypes of the ingroup are relatively different than stereotypes of the out-group. An extension of this
hypothesized in- vs. out-group comparison argues that if in-groups, which people generally have
more sampling experience with and have likely seen more variety among, are viewed as more
heterogeneous and containing a mix of characteristics along a spectrum – a stereotype of the ingroup will tend to be more moderate (i.e., some central tendency between polar extremes). Outgroups are perceived to be less variable than in-groups, a phenomenon called the “out-group
homogeneity effect” (Park & Rothbart, 1982) which leads to common perceptual biases such as
overestimating the number of people in out-groups (Boyer et al., 2012) and the “they’re all the
same” effect, where people from other race or ethnicities appear more similar and difficult to
recognize as individuals than those from one’s own race or ethnicity (Bothwell, Brigham, &
Malpass, 1989; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Biased views of different and homogeneous outgroups are more likely to lead to stereotypes of relatively different or more extreme out-group
characteristics, accordingly informing beliefs about interaction risks, and the out-group
propensity to cooperate.
Both younger and older adults hold ageist stereotypes about older adults (Palmore, 1999, Nelson,
2002) as well as younger adults (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2000; Hehman & Bugental, 2012). For
example, younger people tend to expect little variation in older adults’ political affiliation and
open-mindedness (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). When young adult college students were given the
task of describing a group of older adults, they used more simple and extreme descriptions than
they did when describing other young adults (Linville, 1982). Kite, Deaux, & Miele (1991)
found that older people were believed less likely to possess agentic (i.e., assertive, self-profiting)
characteristics. Older adults also hold ageist stereotypes about younger adults and treat them
discriminately (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2000; Hehman & Bugental, 2012). Older adults tend to
expect little variation in younger adults’ discipline and thoughtfulness (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002).
Young adults are typically viewed as being willing to take risks, something that is not socially
desirable because the risks could harm others as well as themselves (Steinberg, 2008). Younger
adults are also viewed as unable to meet societal expectations of older adults due to their
perceived delinquency, self-absorption, and lack of self-control (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2000).
Ageist stereotypes (Nelson, 2002) commonly center around notions that members of an age
group are uncooperative, cooperative, exploitative, exploitable, willing to take risks (e.g. willing
to challenge others), unwilling to take risks (e.g. not willing to challenge others and
unconditionally accepting), feisty, and lacking an aggressive spirit. This stereotype content
3

responds to systematic principles by mapping onto multiple correlated dimensions to
differentially produce “mixed stereotypes” (Fiske et al., 2002). Cuddy et al., (2004, 2005)
suggest mixed stereotypes are cross-cultural phenomena, providing evidence of their consistency
across 6 varied cultures. Peeters (1983, 1995) has argued for self-profitable (a.k.a “agentic”, noncooperative) and other-profitable (a.k.a. communal, cooperative) traits as fundamental
organizational dimensions of stereotype content. Phalet & Poppe (1997) have also suggested
morality as a major stereotype dimension. We consider cooperativeness as a stereotype
dimension where cooperators do not bluff and do not challenge, and non-cooperators bluff and
challenge.
Ageist beliefs about younger adults and older adults6 may derive from social constructs (Levy,
2009) or adaptive responses (e.g., stigmatization (Kurzban & Leary, 2001) and xenophobia
(Faulkner et al., 2004)) to associated weaknesses7, costs8, perceived challenges9, and threats10
anticipated from distinct age groups. Regardless of their ultimate origins, inaccurate age-based
attributions can lead to under-valuation of older adults (Avolio & Barrett, 1987; Finkelstein,
Burke, & Ragu, 1995), impose economic11 and social costs (PIU, 2000; Palmore, 2005), and
result in perceptions and experiences of discrimination against members of those age groups12.
These hazards carry important implications for public policy (Bugental & Hehman, 2007) and, as
we argue, economics.
Discrimination based on a personal characteristic unrelated to worker productivity (Arrow, 1973)
can impose costs on the firm (Becker, 1971; Taylor & Walker, 1994). Age discrimination by
employers, for example, may bring more costs than savings (Duncan, 2001) because, despite
economic pressures to extend retirement age13, employers show a reluctance to employ older
workers (Kite et al., 2005; Lahey, 2005; Loretto & White, 2006).

6

Older adult, and younger adult function as superordinate age categories which encompass several traits describing
older and younger adults, respectively (Brewer et al., 1981; Hummert, 1990; Schmidt & Boland, 1986).
7
Examples include incompetence of young (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2000) and incompetence of older (Cuddy et
al., 2005; Fiske et al., 2002; Hill et al., 1995).
8
Costs include those of supporting older adults and seniority-based salaries (Butler, 1989; Bendick et al. 1999;
Riach & Rich, 2006), and the costs of supporting young adults (March, 2012).
9
Exposure to different age groups could prime comparisons of age-group stereotypes, leading to fear/anxiety of
confirming the stereotypes and, in turn, performance deficits further reinforcing the prior stereotypes (Steele &
Aronson, 1995)
10
Age-group threats may be perceived to derive from the risky behaviors youth engage in that could harm self and
others (Gross & Hardin, 2007; Steinberg, 2008), and from physical disability (Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003) and
other visible features of aging often fallaciously perceived to correlate with increased vulnerability to infectious
disease (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 2002; Duncan & Schaller, 2009).
11
Medicare and special programs targeting older people amount to $300 billion in costs annually, employment
discrimination against older workers amount to $60 billion in opportunity costs annually (Palmore, 2005).
12
Younger and older adults report experiencing age discrimination (Gregory, 2001; Snape & Redman, 2003; OECD,
2006) and are more likely to report experiences with age discrimination than middle-aged adults (Garstka, Hummert,
& Branscombe, 2005; Garstka, Schmitt, Branscombe, & Hummert, 2004).
13
The 55 to 64 year age bracket is the quickest growing sector of the labor pool (AARP, 2000; Albright & Cluff,
2005; Callanan & Greenhaus, 2008; Calo, 2007; Toossi, 2004, Weiss & Maurer, 2004) and despite life expectancy
increasing throughout the 20th and now 21st centuries retirement ages have decreased resulting in more people
spending more time in retirement (NIA 2007).
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The older-worker advantage (Shea & Haasen, 2006) and the potential added benefit of
intergenerational interactions (Grund & Westergård-Nielsen, 2005, Pelled et al., 1999; Kilduff et
al., 2000) represent economic and social opportunities too important to dismiss solely on the
basis of potentially inaccurate beliefs about age.
Predictions
To address the questions “do people stereotype and discriminate based on age?” and “who is
economically harmed by ageism?” we test the following predictions about ageist stereotypes and
ageist interactions.
Guesses: age stereotypes. We predict that participants reveal age-based stereotypes, attributing
either different or more polar extreme (i.e., always or never) characteristics to the out-group (as
compared to unknown-aged groups or in-groups) in a systematically linked manner (i.e., where
the tendency to bluff positively correlates with the tendency to challenge) tracking
“cooperativeness”(P1). Specifically we predict that when compared to the in-group or unknownaged group, the out-group is stereotyped with attributions that are relatively different (P1.1), and
relatively extreme (P1.2). We additionally predict that these age-based stereotypes will be
systematically linked between both characteristics investigated (i.e., tendency to bluff and
tendency to challenge) to form a single dimension of “cooperativeness”: people’s belief in an age
group’s tendency to bluff are positively correlated with belief in that age group’s tendency to
challenge (P1.3). Furthermore, we predict that these stereotypes are relatively inaccurate such
that investment in one’s own age-based beliefs (via guesses made in the guess game) is
economically costly (P2). Specifically, we predict that relatively different stereotypes are
inaccurate (P2.1) and costly (P2.2) for those in our sample who are difference stereotypers, and
that relatively extreme stereotypes are inaccurate (P2.3) and costly (P2.4) for those who are
extreme stereotypers.
Interactions: age discrimination and economic costs. We investigate how interaction behavior
is strategically affected by age-group stereotypes and whether this strategic behavior is
economically costly. The first set of predictions is that people attempt to maximize economic
gains by strategically acting in accordance with stereotypes (P3).
Specifically we predict that difference stereotypers’ noncooperation (based on bluffing and
challenging) is relatively different with the out-group (compared to unknown-aged group or ingroup) (P3.1). We also predict that extreme stereotypers’ noncooperation is relatively extreme
(more always or never bluffing and challenging) with the out-group (compared to unknown-aged
group or in-group) (P3.2).
Our second set of predictions is that behavior with the out-group, strategically based on age
group stereotypes, is economically costly to those age stereotypers acting on their ageism (P4).
Specifically, difference stereotypers’ behavior, in strategic response to anticipated behavior of
the out-group, is economically costly (P4.1). Similarly, we predict that extreme stereotypers’
behavior, in strategic response to anticipated behavior of the out-group, is economically costly
(P4.2).
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Methods
Sample
Others have compared the economic decision making behavior of healthy older adults and
younger students in the laboratory, in some cases finding a large difference between age groups
(Charness & Villeval, 1995; Fehr et al., 2002) and in other cases finding little or no difference
(Kovalchik et al., 2005; Sutter & Kocher 2007). To our knowledge, however, no one has
examined the economic impacts and effects of age-based stereotyping and discrimination (i.e.
ageism), on both younger and older adults, interacting in the laboratory. The belief elicitation we
used allows us to examine why cooperation might increase in one role, but decrease in another.
Our participant group was drawn from two independently living healthy populations, one of
older adults and one of younger adults. Older adults were recruited through local newspapers at
two large independent living older adult communities, one in Seal Beach California, and one in
Laguna Woods California. Younger adults were recruited from Chapman University’s Economic
Science Institute standard undergraduate subject pool.
20 younger adults (all under the age of 25) were sampled (9 female, 11 male) and 18 reported
their age (ranging from 18 to 22; M = 18.94). 20 older adults (all over the age of 50) were
sampled (13 female, 7 male), 19 reported their age (ranging from 51 to 84; M = 70.11). The
average difference between a participant in younger vs. older age group is 51.17 years, roughly
equivalent to the 50 year age difference of two standard American generations 14.
An objective test of matrix reasoning based on Raven’s-like progressive matrices (both sets 1
and 2) does detect a significant negative age effect on performance (β = -0.478, F(1,33) = 9.766,
p = 0.004, R2 = 0.228), consistent with work reviewed by Salthouse (1992) showing a significant
median correlation of -0.61 between age and Raven’s score across studies with a wide range of
ages, and later work showing a -0.57 correlation (Salthouse, 1993). The performance observed
on these cognitive tasks supports the conclusion that these are all cognitively healthy adults.
Comparing groups for each of the matrix sets (i.e. Set 1: 1-12; Set 2: 13-24) we find that there is
no significant difference with matrix set 1 (items 1-12), but that there is a significant difference
between groups for matrix set 2 (F(8,27) = 3.305, p = 0.009, η = 0.703). When comparing groups
we find that there is no significant difference for self-reported socioeconomic status (F(7,33) =
0.750, p = 0.632, η = 0.371).
Procedure
Younger participants were led into one computer laboratory and older participants led into
another adjacent computer laboratory. These laboratories were visually isolated from one
another. Within each laboratory individual workstations were isolated by partitions. A
progressive matrix task containing 24 matrices was administered. Next, prerecorded instructions
with audio and video were presented. A quiz to ensure comprehension was administered, and the
correct answers to the quiz were reviewed after the instructions. Questions were solicited and
14

As of 2008, the average generation length in the United States was 25 years, up 3.6 years since 1970
(Mathews & Hamilton, 2009). The standard American career-span is 49 years, starting at the beginning of legal
adulthood (18) and ending around the “normal retirement age” of 67 (Social Security Administration, 2009).
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answered individually and privately before progressing with further tasks. All participants
interacted with each other via a software interface using a computer network (see details
describing interaction task in next section below). Font size as displayed on computer screens
was optimized for older adults’ usability (Bernard et al., 2001). Participants interacted in dyadic
interactions, with one taking the role of “Sender” while the other takes the role of
“Receiver”. Personal identities of those involved in interactions were never revealed. Each
participant was told, however, whether the person they were interacting with was of (1) an
unknown-aged group, (2) the same age group as him or herself, or (3) a different age group. The
interaction task was iterated 36 times, each time with a subject not previously interacted with in
the same role. At the conclusion of these interactions, participants were informed about the
computed accuracy of their guesses and results of their interactions. While participants waited
for their payments to be computed, they were administered a brief questionnaire. It took subjects
120 minutes to complete the experiment 15. A lottery was used to select a single guess and
interaction for payment. After conclusion of the experiment, we paid-out participants in US
currency.
Description of Guess Game
Our guess game asked participants to make guesses about how often senders with the available
option sent false messages (on a scale ranging from never, 0% of the time, to always, 100% of
the time) and how often receivers receiving potentially false messages challenged the message
veracity (on a scale ranging from never, 0% of the time, to always, 100% of the time).
Participants made guesses about the anticipated behaviors of interactions of senders and
receivers from same, different, and unknown-aged groups participating in the experiment that
day, but who would not interact with the guess makers directly - thereby precluding the
possibility that guesses would have reason to directly influence the behaviors subsequently
chosen in Sender-Receiver interactions (e.g. via the creation of hedging problems noted by
Blanco et al., (2010)). To evaluate the relationship between guess accuracy and incentives we
used a quadratic scoring rule which qualifies as a "proper scoring rule" (e.g. Aczel & Pfanzagl
1966, Savage 1971) or "strictly proper" scoring rule (Winkler & Murphy 1968) because the
expected utility of a guess is uniquely maximized when the guessed behavior is equal to the true
observed behavior. Subjects were told that they could earn money if their guess is within 1/6th
(16.667%) - above or below, of the true observed behavior, else they will not be able to earn
money with their guess. Our incentive compatible guess game was easy to understand and the
graphical and numeric feedback of guess accuracy provided an easy to interpret form of
contextualized information about the various types of interactions between age groups.
Description of Interaction Tasks
Each interaction begins with a computerized coin flip. Heads produces two units for the Sender
and Receiver to share equally (to split); tails produces four units to split. Only senders view the
result of the coin flip. After privately learning the result of the coin flip, the Sender will send one
15

This experiment included a “second phase” which replicated and followed the “first phase” described in the
procedure section. During our second phase a participant chose to terminate participation and leave the laboratory,
invalidating intended experimental procedures for participants in the second phase (but not the first phase). We do
not report results of the second phase.
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of two messages about the result. A message of "Two to Split" tells the Receiver that the coin
landed heads up, and there are two units to split. A message of "Four to split", tells the Receiver
that the coin landed tails up, and there are four units to split. If the coin flip shows four the
sender can either send a message of "two to split" (a bluff) that is inconsistent with the coin flip
result or a message of "four to split" that is consistent with it. If the coin flip shows two, the
sender can only send the message "two to split", which is consistent with the result of the coin
flip. The payoffs to both players are contingent on (i) the result of the coin flip, (ii) the message
sent by the Sender and (iii) the Receiver's decision to either accept or challenge the Senders'
message (see also Figure 1 below where payoffs are reported).

Figure 1. Game diagram of Sender-Receiver interaction.

Results
We examine whether ageism (behavior based on either relatively different or relatively extreme
beliefs about others, based on their age group membership) exists and whether it leads to
economic harm. The results below evaluate whether younger and older adults discriminate upon
age groups, and whether the economic effects of these beliefs and belief-contingent interactions
from the Sender-Receiver game are economically harmful.
To evaluate whether participants’ hold relatively different beliefs about the out-group’s behavior
propensity (P1.1), we examine guesses at the individual level. For each participant, we compare
guesses they made about the out-group’s bluff and challenge propensity to guesses they made
about these propensities in their in-group and in the unknown-aged group. The results are
8

reported in Table 1 panel (a). Using matched-pair tests16, we observe that all cases of elicited
beliefs about the out-group’s noncooperation propensity are relatively different. Younger adults
believed older adults would bluff 30.1% of the time possible, which was less than the 56.9% they
expected of their own age group (Z = -3.735, p < 0.001) or the 46.0% they expected of the
unknown-aged group (Z = -3.735, p < 0.001). Younger adults believed older adults would
challenge 29.75% of the time possible, less than the 49.4% they expected of their own age group
or the 42.3% they expected of the unknown-aged group (Z = -3.829 p<0.001, Z= -3.287 p =
0.001, respectively). Conversely, older adults believed younger adults would bluff 57.65% of
the time possible, which was more than the 38.0% they expected of their own age group, or the
42.3% they expected of the unknown-aged group (Z = 2.726, p < 0.01; Z = 3.348, p < 0.001,
respectively). Furthermore, older adults believed younger adults would challenge 58.8% of the
time possible, more than the 35.8% they expected of their own age group or the 37.0% they
expected of the unknown-aged group (Z = 2.991, p < 0.01: Z = 3.233, p < 0.01, respectively).
Average guesses about target group (i.e. the in-group, the unknown-aged group, and the outgroup) are plotted in Figure 2 for younger and older adults.

Figure 2. Behaviors guessed and discovered of target groups by younger and older adults.

To identify the individual younger and older adults that are driving the above difference
stereotype effects (i.e., younger adults believing older adults to be more cooperative, and older
adults believing younger adults to be less cooperative), we compare each individual’s guesses
(elicited beliefs) about their out-group with their guesses about their in-group. We also compare
16

The results of Shapiro-Wilk tests reject the null hypothesis that the data is normally distributed and we report the
results of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test unless otherwise stated.
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each individual’s guesses about their out-group with their guesses about the unknown-aged
group. We identify participants as holding these directional difference stereotypes (about bluff or
challenge propensity) if significant differences are observed in the above comparisons using a
one-tailed student-t test17 with one degree of freedom at the five percent level. Comparing beliefs
about in-group and out-group bluff propensity, we identify 14 individuals (8 younger adults and
6 older adults) as difference stereotypers. Comparing beliefs about in-group and out-group
challenge propensity, we identify 15 individuals (10 younger adults and 5 older adults) as
difference stereotypers. Most individuals with difference beliefs about out-group challenge
behavior (relative to the in-group) are among those with difference beliefs about out-group bluff
behavior (relative to the in-group) and vice versa. There are 10 individuals (6 younger adults and
4 older adults) who are among the 14 difference bluff stereotypers and 15 difference challenge
stereotypers (identified by in-group out-group comparison). Overall, from in-group out-group
comparisons, we observe a grand total of 19 individuals (12 younger adults and 7 older adults)
with difference stereotypes of bluff and/or challenge propensity.
Comparing beliefs about unknown-aged group and out-group bluff propensity, we identify 13
individuals (6 younger adults and 7 older adults) as difference stereotypers. Comparing beliefs
about in-group and out-group challenge propensity, we identify 10 individuals (5 younger adults
and 5 older adults) as difference stereotypers. Most individuals with difference beliefs about outgroup challenge behavior (relative to the unknown-aged group) are among those with difference
beliefs about out-group bluff behavior (relative to the unknown-aged group) and vice versa.
There are 8 individuals (3 younger adults and 5 older adults) who are among the 13 difference
bluff stereotypers and 10 difference challenge stereotypers (identified by unknown-aged group
out-group comparison). Overall, from unknown-aged group out-group comparisons, we observe
a grand total of 15 individuals (8 younger adults and 7 older adults) with difference stereotypes
of bluff and/or challenge propensity. We find most (13/19) of the set of difference stereotypers
from the in-group out-group comparison among difference stereotypers identified by the
unknown-aged group out-group comparison (8 younger adults and 5 older adults). Conversely,
we find most (13/15) of the set of difference stereotypers from the unknown-aged group outgroup comparison among difference stereotypers identified by the in-group out-group
comparison. Of these 13 difference stereotypers revealed by both kinds of out-group
comparisons, 8 are younger adults and 5 are older adults.
To evaluate whether participants’ hold relatively extreme beliefs about the out-group’s behavior
propensity (P1.2), we examine guesses at the individual level: using matched-pair tests, the
extremeness of beliefs about the out-group is compared to the extremeness of beliefs about the
in-group and unknown-aged group beliefs. Specifically, we evaluated how close these guesses
were to attributions of either “always” (100% of time) or “never” (0% of time) behavior
propensity (e.g., bluffing, challenging). Thus we argue, the closer (smaller) the constructed
metric is, the more extreme the stereotype. The results are reported in Table 1 panel (b). We
observe that only younger adults held relatively extreme stereotypes about the out-group.
Younger adults held more extreme beliefs about older adults’ bluff propensity than of their own
age group or the unknown-aged group (Z = -3.328, p < 0.001: Z = -3.549, p < 0.001,
respectively), and more extreme beliefs of older adults’ challenge propensity than of their own
17
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age group or the unknown-aged group (Z = -3.533, p < 0.001; Z = -3.736, p < 0.001,
respectively).
To identify the individual younger adults that are driving the above extreme stereotype effect
(where the out-group is viewed as more extreme than the comparison group), we compare each
younger adult’s guesses (elicited beliefs) about the out-group with their guesses about the ingroup. We also compare each individual’s guesses about their out-group with their guesses about
the unknown-aged group. We identify participants as holding these extreme stereotypes (about
bluff and challenge propensity) if significant differences are observed in the above comparisons
using a one-tailed student-t test18 with one degree of freedom at the five percent level.
Comparing beliefs about in-group and out-group bluff propensity, we identify 8 individuals (7
younger adults, and 1 older adult) as extreme stereotypers. Comparing beliefs about in-group and
out-group challenge propensity, we identify 9 individuals (8 younger adults, and 1 older adult) as
extreme stereotypers. Most individuals with extreme beliefs about out-group challenge behavior
(relative to the in-group) are among those with extreme beliefs about out-group bluff behavior
(relative to the in-group) and vice versa. There are 5 individuals (4 younger adults and 1 older
adult) who are among the 8 extreme bluff stereotypers and 9 extreme challenge stereotypers
(identified by in-group out-group comparison). Overall, from in-group out-group comparisons,
we observe a grand total of 12 individuals (11 younger adults and 1 older adult) with extreme
stereotypes of bluff and/or challenge propensity.
Comparing beliefs about unknown-aged group and out-group bluff propensity, we identify 8
individuals (6 younger adults, and 2 older adults) as extreme stereotypers. Comparing beliefs
about unknown-aged group and out-group challenge propensity, we identify 9 individuals (6
younger adults, and 3 older adults) as extreme stereotypers. No more than half of the individuals
with extreme beliefs about out-group challenge behavior (relative to the unknown-aged group)
are among those with extreme beliefs about out-group bluff behavior (relative to the unknownaged group) and vice versa. There are 4 individuals (3 younger adults and 1 older adult) who are
among the 8 extreme bluff stereotypers and 9 extreme challenge stereotypers (identified by ingroup out-group comparison). Overall, from unknown-aged group out-group comparisons, we
observe a grand total of 13 individuals (9 younger adults and 4 older adults) with extreme
stereotypes of bluff and/or challenge propensity. We find most (9/12, composed of 8 younger
adults and 1 older adult) of the set of extreme stereotypers from the in-group out-group
comparison among extreme stereotypers from the unknown-aged group out-group comparison.
Conversely, we find most (9/13, composed of 8 younger adults and 1 older adult) of the set of
extreme stereotypers from the unknown-aged group out-group comparison among extreme
stereotypers from the in-group out-group comparison.
Furthermore, we find most (11/12) of the extreme stereotypers from the in-group out-group
comparison among difference stereotypers from the in-group out-group comparison (10 younger
adults and 1 older adult). Conversely, we find most (11/19) of the difference stereotypers from
the in-group out-group comparison among extreme stereotypers from the in-group out-group
comparison. We also find most (11/13) of the extreme stereotypers from the unknown-aged
group out-group comparison among difference stereotypers from the unknown-aged group outgroup comparison (8 younger adults and 3 older adults). Conversely, we find most (11/15) of the
18
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difference stereotypers from the unknown-aged group out-group comparison among extreme
stereotypers from the unknown-aged out-group comparison.
To evaluate whether bluff and challenge stereotypes are systematically linked dimensions of
cooperation (P1.3), we examine Spearman's rank correlation coefficients, evaluating evidence of
positive correlation between guesses about bluff and challenge propensity in age-based in-groups
and out-groups. Guesses about in-groups’ bluff propensity are positively correlated with guesses
about in-groups’ challenge propensity (ρ = 0.6144, p < 0.001). When we examine younger and
older adults separately, this correlation is not significant for younger adults (ρ = 0.0970, p =
0.6842) but is significant for older adults (ρ = 0.8513, p < 0.001). Guesses about out-groups’
bluff propensity are positively correlated with guesses about out-groups’ challenge propensity (ρ
= 0.8487, p < 0.001). When we evaluate younger and older adults separately, this correlation is
significant for both younger adults (ρ = 0.7364, p < 0.001) and older adults (ρ = 0.6483, p =
0.002). Additionally, we observe that guesses about unknown-aged groups’ challenge propensity
are positively correlated with guesses about their challenge propensity (ρ = 0.6500, p < 0.001).
When we evaluate younger and older adults separately, this correlation is significant for both
younger adults (ρ = 0.5360, p = 0.0148) and older adults (ρ = 0.6925, p < 0.001).
To evaluate whether stereotypes of different characteristics or polar extreme characteristics
attributed to the out-group (via guesses made in the guess game) are relatively inaccurate (P2.1,
P2.3), we first construct an error measure by subtracting each guess from the behavior
subsequently observed for the target group guessed about. Errors of beliefs about anticipated
interactions (i.e. accuracy of beliefs) are reported in Table 1 panel (c). To evaluate whether
stereotypes of different characteristics or polar extreme characteristics attributed to the out-group
(via guesses made in the guess game) are relatively costly (P2.2, P2.4), we measure the
economic consequences of erroneous beliefs and report mean guess payoffs in Table 1 panel (d).
The maximum payoff was $10 and decreases to $0 if the guess is more than 16.667% (1/6) from
the actual.19 Thus, the largest differences between guesses about bluff or challenge propensity
and actual behavior correspond to the smallest game payoffs.
To test P2.1 and P2.2 (that difference stereotypes are inaccurate and costly to believers) we
compare difference stereotypers (revealed by in-group out-group comparisons) against all others
(further evaluating younger and older adults separately). We find no significant differences in
accuracy or earnings from guesses about out-group for younger and older adults combined,
however we do find differences when age groups are examined separately. Young adult
difference stereotypers are more accurate (than all other younger adults) when guessing about the
out-group’s bluff propensity (Z = -2.56, p = 0.011), however we do not observe significantly
different payoffs from these scored guesses. Younger adult difference stereotypers are more
accurate (than all other younger adults) when guessing about the out-group’s challenge
propensity (Z = -2.73, p = 0.006), however we do not observe significantly different payoffs
from these scored guesses. Older adult difference stereotypers are less accurate (than all other
older adults) when guessing about the out-group’s bluff propensity (Z = 2.73, p = 0.006),
however we do not observe significantly different payoffs from these scored guesses. Older adult
difference stereotypers are less accurate (than all other older adults) when guessing about the
19

Guess payoffs were paid according to the formula maximum{0, $10(1 – 36(guess – actual)^2)}, where the guess
and actual amounts are proportions on the unit interval.
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out-group’s challenge propensity (Z = 2.84, p < 0.005), however we do not observe significantly
different payoffs from these scored guesses.
To test P2.3 and P2.4 (that extreme stereotypes are inaccurate and costly to believers) we
compare extreme stereotypers (revealed by in-group out-group comparisons) against all others
(further evaluating younger and older adults separately). We find no significant differences in
accuracy or earnings from guesses about out-group for younger and older adults combined,
however we do find differences (among younger adults) when age groups are examined
separately. Young adult extreme stereotypers are more accurate (than all other younger adults)
when guessing about the out-group’s bluff propensity (Z = -3.226, p = 0.001), however we do
not observe significantly different payoffs from these scored guesses. Younger adult extreme
stereotypers are more accurate (than all other younger adults) when guessing about the outgroup’s challenge propensity (Z = -3.329, p = 0.001), however we do not observe significantly
different payoffs from these scored guesses.
To evaluate whether stereotypers’ behavior in the Sender-Receiver game are affected by their
stereotypes of the out-group (P3), we first compare, against all others, their bluff and challenge
behaviors in interactions with the out-group. Next, to evaluate whether these stereotypers’
behaviors with the outgroup is economically costly to those age stereotypers (P4), we construct
metrics for game performance, which we label expected payoff, rather than relying upon the
experimental profits. This allows us to attribute expected differences due to behaviors employed
rather than stochastic realizations generated during the experiment.20 The expected payoff is
reported in Table 2 panel (b).21
To evaluate whether difference stereotypers’ behaviors in the Sender-Receiver game are affected
by their difference stereotypes of the out-group (P3.1), and whether these stereotypers receive
relatively different payoffs in the Sender-Receiver game (informing 1.4.1), we compare, against
all others, their bluff and challenge behaviors in interactions with the out-group. Younger adult
difference stereotypers do not exhibit significantly different challenge behavior and do not
receive significantly different payoffs as receivers facing the out-group in the Sender-Receiver
game (compared with all other younger adults). However, young adult difference stereotypers do
exhibit significantly different bluff behavior (bluffing more often, Z = -2.54, p = 0.011) and do
receive significantly different payoffs (earning more, Z = -2.54, p = 0.011) as senders facing the
out-group in the Sender-Receiver game (compared with all other younger adults). Older adult
difference stereotypers do not exhibit significantly different bluff behavior or receive
significantly different payoffs as senders facing the out-group, but they do exhibit significantly
different challenge behavior (challenging less often, Z = 2.20, p = 0.028) and do receive
20

The same patterns gleaned from examining expected outcomes reveal themselves in realized game outcome: (i)
senders fare better than receivers, (ii) younger adults earn the most as senders when facing older adults, and (iii)
older adults earn the most as receivers when facing younger adults. However, the variances due to stochastic game
realizations render any statistical comparison insignificant. Results are available from the authors upon request.
21
Payoffs were calculated as follows. The expected payoff for a sender, who bluffs α percent of the time possible,
facing group A, is ½[ βA 2 + (1- βA) ] + ½ [ α (1-βA) 4 + (1-α) 2 ] where βA is the average percent of the time that
receivers from group A, who are in a position to challenge, will challenge senders’ messages. Conversely, the
expected payoff for a receiver, who challenges β percent of the time possible, facing group A, is ½[ (1 - β) ] + ½[ αA
{ β 4 + (1-β) } + (1-αA) 2] where αA is the average percent of the time senders form group A, who are in a position
to bluff, will bluff when sending messages to receivers.
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significantly different payoffs (earning less, Z = 2.20, p = 0.028) as receivers facing the outgroup in the Sender-Receiver game (compared with all other older adults).
To evaluate whether extreme stereotypers’ Sender-Receiver behaviors are affected by their
extreme stereotypes of the out-group (P3.2), and whether these stereotypers receive relatively
different payoffs in the Sender-Receiver game (informing 1.4.2), we compare, against all others,
the relatively extremeness of their behavior (more always or never bluffing and challenging) in
interactions with the out-group. Younger adult extreme stereotypers exhibit marginally
significant different challenge behavior (challenging less often, Z = 1.838, p = 0.066) and receive
marginally significant different payoffs (earning more, Z = -1.838, p = 0.066) as receivers facing
the out-group in the Sender-Receiver game (compared with all other younger adults). Likewise,
young adult extreme stereotypers exhibit marginally significant different bluff behavior (bluffing
more often, Z = -1.912, p = 0.056) and receive marginally significant different payoffs (earning
more, Z = -1.912, p = 0.056) as senders facing the out-group in the Sender-Receiver game
(compared with all other younger adults). Older adult extreme stereotypers do not exhibit
significantly different bluff or challenge behaviors or receive significantly different payoffs as
senders or receivers facing the out-group.
Discussion
The research presented in this paper examines whether younger and older adults reveal agebased stereotypes, discriminate based on those stereotypes, and suffer economic costs as a result.
We find that younger and older participants reveal age-based stereotypes, attributing relatively
different and more polar extreme (i.e., always or never) characteristics to the out-group (as
compared to unknown-aged groups or in-groups) in a systematically linked manner (i.e.,
tendency to bluff positively correlates with tendency to challenge). While we find effects of
these stereotypes on game behaviors, we do not find support for the prediction that stereotypes of
different or extreme characteristics attributed to the out-group are relatively inaccurate and
economically costly in terms of earnings derived from the incentivized guess game. When
evaluated against observed behaviors, guesses that stereotype the out-group as relatively
different or relatively extreme in their behavior propensities are more accurate for younger
adults, but less accurate for older adults, and do not affect earnings.
Overall, both younger and older adults overestimated the out-group’s bluff and challenge
propensity. Younger adults overestimated older adults’ bluff and challenge propensity by 9.15%
and 9.75%, respectively. Older adults overestimated younger adults’ bluff and challenge
propensity by 3.65% and 35.8%, respectively. We find partial support for the prediction that
stereotypes shape interaction strategy and affect cooperation: younger adults earn more by
bluffing more in interactions with older adults (as a consequence of their difference stereotypes).
However, older adults earn less by challenging less in interactions with younger adults (despite
their difference stereotypes). We find marginally significant effects for younger adults earning
more by challenging less and bluffing more in interactions with older adults as a consequence of
their extreme stereotypes.
Both males and females in our study showed stereotyping behavior. While some have suggested
a “male warrior hypothesis”, that intergroup processes (specifically, negative attitudes,
14

discrimination, and increased competitiveness towards the out-group) will be more pronounced
among males due to the long history of intergroup conflict involving male rival coalitions
competing over resources relevant for survival and reproduction (Bugental and Beaulieu, 2009;
Van Vugt et al., 2007), we saw no evidence for a sex effect22. We suspect that the presence of
intersexual and intrasexual competition in a mixed sex environment, as well as other risks to
male mating opportunities, may be necessary to trigger sex-specific facultative psychologies (e.g.
see Klavina et al. 2011).
Our study provides support for the notion that people use age group membership to stereotype
other’s behavioral propensities and to discriminately adjust their own interaction styles with
others. We find partial support for extensions of social identity theory and stereotype theory,
namely that people make attributions about age groups where the “out-group” is believed to be
different than the “in-group” (their own age group) and the out-group is believed to be more
uncooperative than they actually are. However, we do not find clear support for a central
assumption of in-group favoritism from social identity theory (Hewstone et al., 2002), namely
that individuals hold a relatively favorable self-concept of themselves (and their in-group)
derived from perceived group membership and a relatively unfavorable concept of those in the
out-group. If we equate the concept of being “cooperative” with a favorable behavior propensity,
and being “uncooperative” with an unfavorable behavioral propensity, we see that the
fundamental inter-group bias premise of the social identity theory prediction (that individuals
“strive for a positive self-concept”; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) does not hold up among our younger
adults. In fact, of all possible target groups, younger adults as well as older adults view younger
adults as the least cooperative. Furthermore, of all possible target groups, both younger and older
adults perform worst predicting the behavior of younger adults than any other target group.
However, the cooperative dimension of a “positive self-concept” may be transitory across the
lifespan, with younger adults favoring a self-image of being non-cooperative whereas older
adults favor a self-image of being cooperative. Further research is needed to evaluate this
possibility.
Our results are most similar to Charness and Villeval (2009) who found older adults to be more
cooperative than younger adults, and found that older adults act especially cooperative when
knowingly interacting with younger adults. In our experiment, younger adults were relatively
less cooperative with the older out-group (than their in-group) in the role of sender and believed
the out-group to be relatively more cooperative (than their in-group). At the same time, younger
adults were relatively more cooperative with the older out-group (than their in-group) in the role
of receiver and believed the out-group to be relatively more cooperative as senders (than their ingroup). This combination of beliefs and behavior is directionally consistent with the game
theoretical response (see Appendix 1) intent on exploiting others. At the same time, older adults
were relatively more cooperative with the younger out-group (than their in-group) in both sender
and receiver roles, despite believing that younger adults were relatively less cooperative (than
their in-group). This behavior is not consistent with the game theoretical response, but
comparable to Charness and Villeval’s result, which the authors interpret as older adults being
“…interested in teaching the juniors the benefits of group cooperation…[because] experience
taught them that cooperation pays off…” (p.974, 2009).
22

Additionally, we examined whether –independent of stereotypes held—males are less cooperative, as suggested
by some literature (e.g. Dreber & Johannesson, 2008). Again, we found no evidence of a sex effect.
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The propensity to socially recognize and categorize others (e.g. based on sex, race, age) occurs
implicitly and results in perceptual biases. Where inter-relationship between recognizable social
groups might pose an economic threat, discrimination and even hostility can be aroused (Butz &
Yogeeswaran, 2011; Hepworth & West, 1988; Hovland & Sears, 1940). Whereas previous work
on ageism has focused on emotional and physiological impacts of ageist discrimination, we have
investigated whether distinct beliefs about age groups cause an economic impact (either positive
or negative) in strategic interactions – an area of concern that has not yet been addressed
experimentally and which should have great impact on public policy and economic concerns.
This study reports an age-stereotype effect where both younger and older individuals alike make
attributions about age groups where the “out-group” is believed to be different than the “ingroup” (their own age group) and believed to be more uncooperative than they are observed to
be. However, we do not find support for the claim that discriminating based on stereotypes will
lead to economic costs. Though it may be considered a socially undesirable disease (Butler,
1989), the stereotyping we observe does not clearly come at an economic cost to those infected
with it by: (1) losing money based on the inaccurate guesses they invest in, and (2) loosing
money in the Sender-Receiver game by effect on contingent strategies. Though younger and
older adults revealed stereotypes in the guess game, there were no significant economic effects
on their scored guesses overall. Older adult difference stereotypers earned less as receivers in the
Sender-Receiver game, but younger difference stereotypers earned more as senders. Younger
adults holding extreme stereotypes of older adults also fared better in intergenerational
interactions than when facing their own age group. In fact, cooperation is higher when subjects
are aware that they are paired with members of the out-group (than when paired with in-group
members), also consistent with Charness and Villeval’s (2009) finding from the field that ageheterogeneous teams are more cooperative than age homogeneous teams.
Evidence of these stereotype propensities and economic effects should be taken note of,
especially given the risk that the identified economic advantages may encourage further ageism.
We should remain concerned that ageism can have many forms of great effect on interaction
outcomes and on individuals involved. This is a source of grave concern given the growing
older-adult population and its potential contribution to labor and other productive relationships.
Due to the unprecedented growth of older adult populations globally which will soon outnumber
child populations (e.g. see Figure 3), and growing sources of intergenerational conflict, the
prevalence of increased health risk, abuse, and neglect among elderly is quickly rising (Lachs &
Pillemer, 2004). In order to address these issues we need to better understand if interpersonal
interaction between generations and decisions affecting them are influenced by stereotype beliefs
and if educational interventions and contextualized experiences within and between age groups
can help overcome ageism.
As the older population grows larger, so do their demands for health care. As progressive chronic
diseases are better controlled and other medical advances contribute to increased survival rates,
allowing more life extension, an expansion in morbidity and disability is expected (Olshansky et
al., 1991; Robine & Michel, 2003). With burgeoning old and disabled populations the negative
impacts of ageism on health service provision (Grant, 1996; Hillerbrand & Shaw 1990) and
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quality of communication about matters of health (Butler, 1975; Greene et al. 1989; Caporael &
Culbertson 1986) will also become increasingly poignant.
The problem of harmful ageism is not unavoidable. We must recognize that there are many
psychological and social reasons to expect ageism, and also recognize that ageists can be
motivated to change their beliefs, so as to bring improvements to themselves and those they
affect.

Figure 3. The changing ratio of adults 65 and over and children under age 5, globally and across time,
based on historical data and demographic projections. (NIA 2012). Reproduced with permission of the
Population Reference Bureau.

The literature on racism and sexism argues that these undesirable traits “can be erased” with
decategorizing frames and counter-stereotype training processes, suggesting that similar results
might be achieved for ageism. For example, the automatic (implicit) encoding of race after brief
presentations is attenuated when racial identity is orthogonal to coalition membership (i.e., when
it is no longer a proxy for in-group / out-group), suggesting that visual cues of race are processed
as correlates of coalitional affiliation (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). “Decategorization”
processes seek to eliminate categorization by not allowing differentiation based on social
category, such as by making in-group members part of a non-differentiated group (Brewer,1999)
or making out-group members part of a non-differentiated group. However, we do not find that
when younger and older adults are facing an “unknown-aged group”, which does not allow for
age-based identification of the interacting participants, they hold less different or extreme beliefs,
or act any more moderately, as compared to when facing known-aged groups.
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Kawakami et al., (2005; 2011) provide evidence that “counter-stereotype training” can be
successfully used to correct undesirable gender stereotypes and decrease intergroup bias in hiring
decisions. A review of intervention programs designed to reduce gender-bias in hiring practices
supports their effectiveness and concluded that there is much evidence that gender-equity can be
effectively promoted (Isaac et al., 2009). We suspect that a similar approach countering
undesirable age stereotypes holds much promise and should be pursued in an effort to improve
intergenerational cooperation.
In 1968, Robert Butler coined the term “ageism”, identifying a two-way problem that existed like
a disease between young and old people (Butler, 1989). As an antidote, Butler proscribed
interventions improving the afflicted parties’ knowledge about the age-related problems at hand.
Though our experiment allowed for ageism to occur and ageist stereotypers to profit from their
age-based discrimination, it also provided adults, separated by two generations, novel
opportunities to learn about intergenerational interactions in a controlled laboratory environment
and, perhaps, to gain new information that counters their previous stereotypes. Future research is
needed to replicate this experiment with a second stage (repeating the first stage after feedback
about scored guesses and interaction outcomes), to evaluate whether stereotypers who suffer
costs from inaccurate beliefs and poor strategy choice improve their beliefs and behaviors. We
hope that interest in and continued activity with intergenerational research studies such as these
will provide pathways towards developing greater intergenerational cooperation and overcoming
harmful ageism.
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Appendix 1. Proof of equilibrium strategy in Bluff-Challenge Strategic Information
Transmission Game
The game theoretic best response behavior is solved below in our environment. The normative
equilibrium is one of mixed strategies.
The sender discovers state is S or L (small value or large value) where each value has equal
probability. The sender’s action depends upon the value of the state:
1)
If state is S, can only send true message that state is S to the receiver.
2)
If state is L, then the sender can either:
a. Send true message [T] to the receiver of L
b. Bluff, sending a false message [F] to the receiver of S
The receiver receives a message of S or L (small value or large value) from the sender. The
sender’s action depends upon the message:
1)
If message is L, the receiver has no choice but to accept. The payoffs for the
sender and receiver are L/2.
2)
If message is S, the receiver can accept or challenge, and the payoffs depend upon
the state:
a. Accept [A]:
- If the message was true (i.e., the state was S), then payoffs for the sender and the
receiver are S/2.
- If the message was false (i.e., the state was L), then payoffs are L - S/2 for the
sender and S/2 for the receiver.
b. Challenge [C]:
- If the message was true (i.e., the state was S), then payoffs are S for the sender
and zero for the receiver.
- If the message was false (i.e., the state was L), then payoffs are zero for the
sender and L for the receiver.
The sender chooses what message to send when the state is L, and the receiver has a choice to
accept or challenge when the message is S. Notice that if the sender was known to always send
true messages, then the receiver would never challenge. However, if the receiver is known to
never challenge, the sender can earn higher payoffs by sending false messages. Furthermore, if
the sender always bluffs, a receiver who always challenges earns higher payoffs. But if the
receiver always challenges, the sender can earn higher payoffs by always sending true
messages. As such the use of pure strategies cannot result in equilibrium.
Instead, assume that the receiver chooses to challenge messages of S with probability β. Then
the sender, seeing the state is L, must choose to send a true [T] message of L or a false [F]
message of S. The sender’s expected payoffs of taking each action are:
E[T] ≡ E[Payoff|state = L, β] = L/2
E[F] ≡ E[Payoff|state = L, β] = (1 - β) (L - S/2)
If the receiver challenges too often (i.e., β is relatively large), then the sender has a higher
expected payoff by sending a true message, but if the receiver challenges too little, then the
sender has an higher expected payoff sending a false message. So the best response depends
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upon β. Given that L = 4 and S = 2, the expected payoffs to the sender are equal when β = ⅓,
and as such, the sender is indifferent to available actions.
Likewise assume the sender chooses to send false messages of S with probability α. The
receiver, seeing the message is S, must choose to challenge [C] or accept [A]. The receiver’s
expected payoffs of taking each action are:
E[A] ≡ E[Payoff| message = S, α] = S/2
E[C] ≡ E[Payoff| message = S, α] = αL/(1+ α)
If the sender sends false messages too often (i.e., α is relatively large), then the receiver has a
higher expected payoff when challenging, but if the sender sends false message too seldom, then
sender has a higher expected payoff when accepting. Given that L = 4 and S = 2, the expected
payoffs to the sender are equal when α = ⅓.
In summary, a Nash equilibrium is to bluff, sending a false message 1/3 of the time possible, and
to challenge 1/3 of the time possible.
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Table 1: Difference, Extremeness, and Accuracy of Guesses
About Bluff Propensity
About Challenge Propensity
In-group Unknown Out-group In-group Unknown Out-group
(a) Relative Difference of Guesses
Elicited from Younger
Elicited from Older
(b) Relative Extremeness of Guesses
Elicited from Younger
Elicited from Older
(c) Accuracy of Guesses
Elicited from Younger
Elicited from Older
(d) Payoffs from Scored Guesses
Earned by Younger
Earned by Older

56.85*
(12.17)

46.00*
(12.67)

30.10
(17.06)

49.35*
(11.80)

42.25*
(11.53)

29.75
(17.98)

38.0*
(18.59)

42.25*
(18.48)

57.65
(22.18)

35.75*
(23.05)

37.00*
(14.75)

58.80
(23.68)

38.65*
(7.87)

40.00*
(8.50)

26.75
(11.70)

40.45*
(6.61)

39.55*
(9.01)

25.95
(12.09)

33.55
(14.53)

36.95
(15.02)

32.25
(14.90)

27.95
(15.27)

36.80
(14.56)

30.70
(15.82)

-25.64*#
(12.67)

-13.1*#
(12.45)

7.36#
(16.48)

-9.21*#
(12.59)

-2.67
(12.14)

0.88
(19.02)

-6.75
(18.85)

-9.52*
(18.50)

-20.15#
(21.77)

5.69*
(23.40)

2.64*
(15.20)

-28.17#
(23.52)

1.76*
(3.23)

5.56
(3.43)

5.04
(4.07)

6.28
(3.54)

6.30
(3.08)

5.40
(4.14)

3.26
(4.08)

4.27
(3.43)

4.05
(4.50)

3.90
(4.01)

5.86*
(3.47)

1.45
(3.07)

Mean and standard deviation reported in parenthesis
* Significantly different from measure when facing the out-group at 5% percent level (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test)
# Significantly different from zero at 5% percent level (Wilcoxon sign test) reported only for accuracy of guesses.
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Table 2: Sender-Receiver game Behavior and Sender-Receiver game (Expected) Payoffs
In the role of Sender facing
In-group

Unknown

(a) Percentage of Time Bluff or Challenge
Younger
32.50
43.25
(33.59)
(40.63)
Older
(b) Expected Payoffs
Younger

In the role of Receiver facing

Out-group

In-group

Unknown

Out-group

53.75
(40.69)

51.92*
(30.79)

44.67*
(34.85)

23.08
(36.74)

30.17
(28.56)

32.00
(35.10)

21.17
(24.18)

30.50
(29.74)

33.33
(32.30)

20.08
(18.30)

1.75*
(0.01)

1.77*
(0.04)

1.90
(0.22)

1.33
(0.00)

1.35*
(0.05)

1.30
(0.11)

Older

1.77
1.77*
1.73
1.33*
1.33*
1.36
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.14)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.03)
* Significantly different from measure when facing the out-group at 5% percent level (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test)
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